1. Rebuttal:
Argument from Divine Hypocrisy
Argument from Atrocity
Argument from Divine Hypocrisy
Argument from Atrocity
Summary:
Belief in God has been used by religions to enact great atrocities that may have been impossible without religious justification.
Rebuttal to: Why does an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God allow atrocities in his name?
Abhijit Naskar, Indian neuroscientist, 1991-
“There has been more bloodshed in the name of God than for any other cause. And it is all because people never attempt to reach the fountain-head. They are content only to comply with the customs of their forefathers, and want others to do the same.”
― Abhijit Naskar, In Search of Divinity: Journey to The Kingdom of Conscience, CreateSpace, 2016
“There has been more bloodshed in the name of God than for any other cause. And it is all because people never attempt to reach the fountain-head. They are content only to comply with the customs of their forefathers, and want others to do the same.”
― Abhijit Naskar, In Search of Divinity: Journey to The Kingdom of Conscience, CreateSpace, 2016
Francis S. Collins, MD, PhD, American physician-geneticist, NIH Director, 1950-
“The pure, clean water of spiritual truth is placed in rusty containers, and the subsequent failings of the church down through the centuries should not be projected onto the faith itself, as if the water had been the problem.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, New York, 2006
“So, while the long history of religious oppression and hypocrisy is profoundly sobering, the earnest seeker must look beyond the behavior of flawed humans in order to find the truth. Would you condemn an oak tree because its timbers had been used to build battering rams? Would you blame the air for allowing lies to be transmitted through it? Would you judge Mozart’s The Magic Flute on the basis of a poorly rehearsed performance by fifth-graders? If you had never seen a real sunset over the Pacific, would you allow a tourist brochure as a substitute? Would you evaluate the power of romantic love solely in the light of an abusive marriage next door? No. A real evaluation of the truth of faith depends upon looking at the clean, pure water, not at the rusty containers.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, New York, 2006
“The pure, clean water of spiritual truth is placed in rusty containers, and the subsequent failings of the church down through the centuries should not be projected onto the faith itself, as if the water had been the problem.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, New York, 2006
“So, while the long history of religious oppression and hypocrisy is profoundly sobering, the earnest seeker must look beyond the behavior of flawed humans in order to find the truth. Would you condemn an oak tree because its timbers had been used to build battering rams? Would you blame the air for allowing lies to be transmitted through it? Would you judge Mozart’s The Magic Flute on the basis of a poorly rehearsed performance by fifth-graders? If you had never seen a real sunset over the Pacific, would you allow a tourist brochure as a substitute? Would you evaluate the power of romantic love solely in the light of an abusive marriage next door? No. A real evaluation of the truth of faith depends upon looking at the clean, pure water, not at the rusty containers.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, New York, 2006
C.S. Lewis, British writer and lay-theologian, 1898-1963
“...If Christianity is true why are not all Christians obviously nicer than all non-Christians? What lies behind that question is partly something very reasonable and partly something that is not reasonable at all. The reasonable part is this. If conversion to Christianity makes no improvement in a man’s outward actions–if he continues to be just as snobbish or spiteful or envious or ambitious as he was before–then I think we must suspect that his ‘conversion’ was largely imaginary; and after one’s original conversion, every time one thinks one has made an advance, that is the test to apply. Fine feelings, new insights, greater interest in ‘religion’ mean nothing unless they make our actual behaviour better; just as in an illness ‘feeling better’ is not much good if the thermometer shows that your temperature is still going up. In that sense the outer world is quite right to judge Christianity by its results. Christ told us to judge by results. A tree is known by its fruit; or, as we say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. When we Christians behave badly, or fail to behave well, we are making Christianity unbelievable to the outside world...
“But there is another way of demanding results in which the outer world may be quite illogical. They may demand not merely that each man’s life should improve if he becomes a Christian: they may also demand before they believe in Christianity that they should see the whole world neatly divided into two camps–Christian and non-Christian–and that all the people in the first camp at any given moment should be obviously nicer than all the people in the second. This is unreasonable on several grounds.
“(1) In the first place the situation in the actual world is much more complicated than that. The world does not consist of 100 per cent. Christians and 100 per cent. non-Christians. There are people (a great many of them) who are slowly ceasing to be Christians but who still call themselves by that name: some of them are clergymen. There are other people who are slowly becoming Christians though they do not yet call themselves so. There are people who do not accept the full Christian doctrine about Christ but who are so strongly attracted by Him that they are His in a much deeper sense than they themselves understand. There are people in other religions who are being led by God’s secret influence to concentrate on those parts of their religion which are in agreement with Christianity, and who thus belong to Christ without knowing it. For example, a Buddhist of good will may be led to concentrate more and more on the Buddhist teaching of about mercy and to leave in the background (though he might still say he believed) the Buddhist teaching on certain other points...
“(2) ...If Christianity is true then it ought to follow (a) that any Christian will be nicer than the same person would be if he were not a Christian. (b) That any man who becomes a Christian will be nicer than he was before... Christian Miss Bates may have an unkinder tongue than unbelieving Dick Firkin. That, by itself, does not tell us whether Christianity works. The question is what Miss Bates’s tongue would be like if she were not a Christian and what Dick’s would be like if he became one. Miss Bates and Dick, as a result of natural causes and early upbringing, have certain temperaments: Christianity professes to put both temperaments under new management if they will allow it to do so. What you have a right to ask is whether that management, if allowed to take over, improves the concern...
“(3) ...We have been talking, in fact, as if Dick were all right; as if Christianity was something nasty people needed and nice ones could afford to do without; and as if niceness was all that God demanded. But this would be a fatal mistake. The truth is that in God’s eyes Dick Firkin needs ‘saving’ every bit as much as Miss Bates...
“You cannot expect God to look at Dick’s placid temper and friendly disposition exactly as we do. They result from natural causes which God Himself creates. Being merely temperamental, they will all disappear if Dick’s digestion alters. The niceness, in fact, is God’s gift to Dick, not Dick’s gift to God. In the same way, God has allowed natural causes, working in a world spoiled by centuries of sin, to produce in Miss Bates the narrow mind and jangled nerves which account for most of her nastiness. He intends, in His own good time, to set that part of her right... It is something they can freely give Him or freely refuse to Him. Will they, or will they not, turn to Him and thus fulfil the only purpose for which they were created? Their free will is trembling inside them like the needle of a compass. But this is a needle that can choose... Will the needle swing round, and settle, and point to God?
“He can help it to do so. He cannot force it. He cannot, so to speak, put out His own hand and pull it into the right position, for then it would not be free will any more...
“We must, therefore, not be surprised if we find among the Christians some people who are still nasty. There is even, when you come to think it over, a reason why nasty people might be expected to turn to Christ in greater numbers than nice ones...
“For mere improvement is not redemption, though redemption always improves people even here and now and will, in the end, improve them to a degree we cannot yet imagine. God became man to turn creatures into sons: not simply to produce better men of the old kind but to produce a new kind of man...”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p164-170
“...If Christianity is true why are not all Christians obviously nicer than all non-Christians? What lies behind that question is partly something very reasonable and partly something that is not reasonable at all. The reasonable part is this. If conversion to Christianity makes no improvement in a man’s outward actions–if he continues to be just as snobbish or spiteful or envious or ambitious as he was before–then I think we must suspect that his ‘conversion’ was largely imaginary; and after one’s original conversion, every time one thinks one has made an advance, that is the test to apply. Fine feelings, new insights, greater interest in ‘religion’ mean nothing unless they make our actual behaviour better; just as in an illness ‘feeling better’ is not much good if the thermometer shows that your temperature is still going up. In that sense the outer world is quite right to judge Christianity by its results. Christ told us to judge by results. A tree is known by its fruit; or, as we say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. When we Christians behave badly, or fail to behave well, we are making Christianity unbelievable to the outside world...
“But there is another way of demanding results in which the outer world may be quite illogical. They may demand not merely that each man’s life should improve if he becomes a Christian: they may also demand before they believe in Christianity that they should see the whole world neatly divided into two camps–Christian and non-Christian–and that all the people in the first camp at any given moment should be obviously nicer than all the people in the second. This is unreasonable on several grounds.
“(1) In the first place the situation in the actual world is much more complicated than that. The world does not consist of 100 per cent. Christians and 100 per cent. non-Christians. There are people (a great many of them) who are slowly ceasing to be Christians but who still call themselves by that name: some of them are clergymen. There are other people who are slowly becoming Christians though they do not yet call themselves so. There are people who do not accept the full Christian doctrine about Christ but who are so strongly attracted by Him that they are His in a much deeper sense than they themselves understand. There are people in other religions who are being led by God’s secret influence to concentrate on those parts of their religion which are in agreement with Christianity, and who thus belong to Christ without knowing it. For example, a Buddhist of good will may be led to concentrate more and more on the Buddhist teaching of about mercy and to leave in the background (though he might still say he believed) the Buddhist teaching on certain other points...
“(2) ...If Christianity is true then it ought to follow (a) that any Christian will be nicer than the same person would be if he were not a Christian. (b) That any man who becomes a Christian will be nicer than he was before... Christian Miss Bates may have an unkinder tongue than unbelieving Dick Firkin. That, by itself, does not tell us whether Christianity works. The question is what Miss Bates’s tongue would be like if she were not a Christian and what Dick’s would be like if he became one. Miss Bates and Dick, as a result of natural causes and early upbringing, have certain temperaments: Christianity professes to put both temperaments under new management if they will allow it to do so. What you have a right to ask is whether that management, if allowed to take over, improves the concern...
“(3) ...We have been talking, in fact, as if Dick were all right; as if Christianity was something nasty people needed and nice ones could afford to do without; and as if niceness was all that God demanded. But this would be a fatal mistake. The truth is that in God’s eyes Dick Firkin needs ‘saving’ every bit as much as Miss Bates...
“You cannot expect God to look at Dick’s placid temper and friendly disposition exactly as we do. They result from natural causes which God Himself creates. Being merely temperamental, they will all disappear if Dick’s digestion alters. The niceness, in fact, is God’s gift to Dick, not Dick’s gift to God. In the same way, God has allowed natural causes, working in a world spoiled by centuries of sin, to produce in Miss Bates the narrow mind and jangled nerves which account for most of her nastiness. He intends, in His own good time, to set that part of her right... It is something they can freely give Him or freely refuse to Him. Will they, or will they not, turn to Him and thus fulfil the only purpose for which they were created? Their free will is trembling inside them like the needle of a compass. But this is a needle that can choose... Will the needle swing round, and settle, and point to God?
“He can help it to do so. He cannot force it. He cannot, so to speak, put out His own hand and pull it into the right position, for then it would not be free will any more...
“We must, therefore, not be surprised if we find among the Christians some people who are still nasty. There is even, when you come to think it over, a reason why nasty people might be expected to turn to Christ in greater numbers than nice ones...
“For mere improvement is not redemption, though redemption always improves people even here and now and will, in the end, improve them to a degree we cannot yet imagine. God became man to turn creatures into sons: not simply to produce better men of the old kind but to produce a new kind of man...”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p164-170
Rebuttal to: Belief in God itself causes greater immorality than it makes up for in inspiring moral acts.
Abhijit Naskar, Indian neuroscientist, 1991-
“The problem is not religion or God. The actual problem is authoritarianism, mixed with the desire to angrily impose one’s personal apparently idealistic beliefs on others.”
― Abhijit Naskar (source unknown)
“The problem is not religion or God. The actual problem is authoritarianism, mixed with the desire to angrily impose one’s personal apparently idealistic beliefs on others.”
― Abhijit Naskar (source unknown)
J.P. Moreland, American philosopher & theologian, 1948-
“[Patrick] Sherry argues [in Spirit, Saints, and Immortality] a type of causal argument from religious experience and that says that, after all, it has been Christian theism which has produced heroes like Mother Teresa and others, who have gone around the world and who have reached out to people in great numbers and have performed supererogatory acts of heroism on behalf of God or humanity. He says that this provides evidence that the Christian faith is true, because of the Power that is postulated to explain the production of such heroes. Spiritual work has been done.“Now one could object to this by pointing out periods like the Crusades or the modern church where the church is not producing saints and heroes. A Christian theist could respond by pointing out that these are not good test cases for ‘authentic’ Christianity. In order to keep from making this a question-begging counter-argument, I suggest the following: One should go to the New Testament, study the New Testament itself, and derive an hypothesis, independent of the actual practices of the church at any period of history which would state what spiritual practices, what model of spiritual growth ought to regularly produce transformed persons if God really exists. One could then test this hypothesis to see if saints and heroes are, in fact, produced. And that would provide an empirical test that would lend some kind of confirmation to Christian theism.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p86
“[Patrick] Sherry argues [in Spirit, Saints, and Immortality] a type of causal argument from religious experience and that says that, after all, it has been Christian theism which has produced heroes like Mother Teresa and others, who have gone around the world and who have reached out to people in great numbers and have performed supererogatory acts of heroism on behalf of God or humanity. He says that this provides evidence that the Christian faith is true, because of the Power that is postulated to explain the production of such heroes. Spiritual work has been done.“Now one could object to this by pointing out periods like the Crusades or the modern church where the church is not producing saints and heroes. A Christian theist could respond by pointing out that these are not good test cases for ‘authentic’ Christianity. In order to keep from making this a question-begging counter-argument, I suggest the following: One should go to the New Testament, study the New Testament itself, and derive an hypothesis, independent of the actual practices of the church at any period of history which would state what spiritual practices, what model of spiritual growth ought to regularly produce transformed persons if God really exists. One could then test this hypothesis to see if saints and heroes are, in fact, produced. And that would provide an empirical test that would lend some kind of confirmation to Christian theism.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p86
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“...There can be no doubt that [Bertrand Russell’s] indictment of the Church is soundly based in medieval history. He is also right in saying that belief in hell played a part in the matter. But those who practised things which today make our blood ‘run cold’ were most certainly and emphatically not following Christ, whose Gospel was of mercy and love. The most beautiful and lovely things in the world seem to be the most capable of perversion. Our author appears to us to be terribly wrong when he says that Christ had any responsibility for those who perverted His teaching. The only effective criticism here is of those who misunderstood and failed to follow Christ. We would not say that the discoverer of drugs such as barbiturates which are used to alleviate pain is responsible for the suicides of those who take them deliberately in too large doses. Nor is the idea of hell that of cruelty. We do not call a surgical operation cruel.
“In all this we must not forget that Christ taught there is an active cause of evil in the world whom He called Satan, whose hall-mark is seen wherever malevolent cruelty is found. His method is often first to pervert and distort men’s ideas about God, leading them to commit what are in fact most horrible crimes against humanity. Nowhere in Christ’s teaching is there the slightest suggestion of an angry God who must be propitiated. From this mistaken idea arose all the cruelties our author rightly condemns. God’s anger is directed towards those who persecute His children. We believe that God has so arranged matters that those who have suffered unjustly on earth for His sake will enjoy the light of His presence eternally. No longer shall there be suffering for the faults of others, and justice shall be established. Where is the cruelty in this plan?”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p57
“[Bertrand Russell] holds that the more thoroughly the Christian faith has been believed the greater the outbreaks of cruelty have been. This objection could be sustained only by showing that the true Christian religion, as taught by Christ, approved the spread of the Kingdom of God by violent means. The truth is surely the exact opposite of this. When St. Peter used his sword in the Garden of Gethsemane and cut off the ear of Malchus, a servant of the high priest, Jesus healed the injury and gently rebuked Peter, saying: ‘Put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.’ He also said: ‘Blessed are the meek,’ where ‘blessed means ‘happy,’ and was used by the Greeks of their gods (Gk. makarios). Our author knows the words of Christ about turning the other cheek and not resisting evil. Christians are to be gentle and not quick in self-assertive defence of their rights. When men exhibit fanaticism and intolerance and use force they are not obeying Christ. In effect, our author gives us a reminder of the harm done by those who make a profession of being Christian and yet fail to follow Christ. He misinterprets history if he identifies fervid zeal with faithful service in all cases. There is no indictment found of Christianity.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p62
DIRECT ARGUMENTS
“...There can be no doubt that [Bertrand Russell’s] indictment of the Church is soundly based in medieval history. He is also right in saying that belief in hell played a part in the matter. But those who practised things which today make our blood ‘run cold’ were most certainly and emphatically not following Christ, whose Gospel was of mercy and love. The most beautiful and lovely things in the world seem to be the most capable of perversion. Our author appears to us to be terribly wrong when he says that Christ had any responsibility for those who perverted His teaching. The only effective criticism here is of those who misunderstood and failed to follow Christ. We would not say that the discoverer of drugs such as barbiturates which are used to alleviate pain is responsible for the suicides of those who take them deliberately in too large doses. Nor is the idea of hell that of cruelty. We do not call a surgical operation cruel.
“In all this we must not forget that Christ taught there is an active cause of evil in the world whom He called Satan, whose hall-mark is seen wherever malevolent cruelty is found. His method is often first to pervert and distort men’s ideas about God, leading them to commit what are in fact most horrible crimes against humanity. Nowhere in Christ’s teaching is there the slightest suggestion of an angry God who must be propitiated. From this mistaken idea arose all the cruelties our author rightly condemns. God’s anger is directed towards those who persecute His children. We believe that God has so arranged matters that those who have suffered unjustly on earth for His sake will enjoy the light of His presence eternally. No longer shall there be suffering for the faults of others, and justice shall be established. Where is the cruelty in this plan?”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p57
“[Bertrand Russell] holds that the more thoroughly the Christian faith has been believed the greater the outbreaks of cruelty have been. This objection could be sustained only by showing that the true Christian religion, as taught by Christ, approved the spread of the Kingdom of God by violent means. The truth is surely the exact opposite of this. When St. Peter used his sword in the Garden of Gethsemane and cut off the ear of Malchus, a servant of the high priest, Jesus healed the injury and gently rebuked Peter, saying: ‘Put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.’ He also said: ‘Blessed are the meek,’ where ‘blessed means ‘happy,’ and was used by the Greeks of their gods (Gk. makarios). Our author knows the words of Christ about turning the other cheek and not resisting evil. Christians are to be gentle and not quick in self-assertive defence of their rights. When men exhibit fanaticism and intolerance and use force they are not obeying Christ. In effect, our author gives us a reminder of the harm done by those who make a profession of being Christian and yet fail to follow Christ. He misinterprets history if he identifies fervid zeal with faithful service in all cases. There is no indictment found of Christianity.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p62
2. Rebuttal:
The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil
Summary:
God cannot be omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient all at once while evil also exists, because these are in contradiction.
The Free Will Defense: An omnibenevolent god allows free will, which necessitates allowing evil.
C.S. Lewis, British writer and lay-theologian, 1898-1963
“...God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go either wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata – of creatures that worked like machines – would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that they must be free.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p47-48
“...God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go either wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata – of creatures that worked like machines – would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that they must be free.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p47-48
Peter John Kreeft, American professor of philosophy, 1937-
“Now, the classic defense of God against the problem of evil is that it’s not logically possible to have free will and no possibility of moral evil. In other words, once God chose to create human beings with free will, then it was up to them, rather than to God, as to whether there was sin or not. That’s what free will means. Built into the situation of God deciding to create human beings is the chance of evil and, consequently, the suffering that results...
“No, [God] created the possibility of evil; people actualized the potentiality. The source of evil is not God’s power but mankind’s freedom. Even an all-powerful God could not have created a world in which people had genuine freedom and yet there was no potentiality for sin, because our freedom includes the possibility of sin within its own meaning. It’s a self-contradiction–a meaningless nothing–to have a world where there’s a real choice while at the same time no possibility of choosing evil. To ask why God didn’t create such a world is like asking why God didn’t create colorless color or round squares.”
— Peter Kreeft (quoted by Lee Strobel), The Case for Faith, Zondervan, 2014
“Now, the classic defense of God against the problem of evil is that it’s not logically possible to have free will and no possibility of moral evil. In other words, once God chose to create human beings with free will, then it was up to them, rather than to God, as to whether there was sin or not. That’s what free will means. Built into the situation of God deciding to create human beings is the chance of evil and, consequently, the suffering that results...
“No, [God] created the possibility of evil; people actualized the potentiality. The source of evil is not God’s power but mankind’s freedom. Even an all-powerful God could not have created a world in which people had genuine freedom and yet there was no potentiality for sin, because our freedom includes the possibility of sin within its own meaning. It’s a self-contradiction–a meaningless nothing–to have a world where there’s a real choice while at the same time no possibility of choosing evil. To ask why God didn’t create such a world is like asking why God didn’t create colorless color or round squares.”
— Peter Kreeft (quoted by Lee Strobel), The Case for Faith, Zondervan, 2014
Francis S. Collins, MD, PhD, American physician-geneticist, NIH Director, 1950-
“In the first place, let us recognize that a large fraction of our suffering and that of our fellow human beings is brought about by what we do to one another. It is humankind, not God, that had invented knives, arrows, guns, bombs, and all manner of other instruments of torture used through the ages. The tragedy of the young child killed by a drunk driver, of the innocent young man dying on the battlefield, or of the young girl cut down by a stray bullet in a crime-ridden section of a modern city can hardly be blamed on God. After all, we have somehow been given free will, the ability to do as we please. We use this ability frequently to disobey the Moral Law. And when we do so, we shouldn’t then blame God for the consequences.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, 2007
“In the first place, let us recognize that a large fraction of our suffering and that of our fellow human beings is brought about by what we do to one another. It is humankind, not God, that had invented knives, arrows, guns, bombs, and all manner of other instruments of torture used through the ages. The tragedy of the young child killed by a drunk driver, of the innocent young man dying on the battlefield, or of the young girl cut down by a stray bullet in a crime-ridden section of a modern city can hardly be blamed on God. After all, we have somehow been given free will, the ability to do as we please. We use this ability frequently to disobey the Moral Law. And when we do so, we shouldn’t then blame God for the consequences.”
― Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Free Press, 2007
Elmer Leon Towns, American professor of theology & pastor, 1932-
“God had to be sovereign over His plan, yet allow freedom within His plan. This involved a divine paradox: how could God remain an absolute Ruler of the universe, yet make man accountable to His plan? And even when man was given freedom, the plan of God had to bring glory to God, both in those who were rewarded for compliance with God’s plan and in punishment of those who rebelled against His plan.
“The decree of God is seen in the following. First, God decided to create a world that was good and beautiful. He decided that the universe would be stable and reflect the uniformity and regularity of laws that are the nature of His being. For it is through laws that god controls both man and the universe. Since laws are an extension of the nature of God, this is one way that God is everywhere present and makes everything accountable to Him. Next, God decided to create man in His image. God predetermined that man would have His nature, and man became the crowning act of creation. As such, man had freedom and autonomy, and in this wise decree, God decided to allow the freedom of His creatures to choose or reject His rule over them. Man could choose to live in harmony with God’s eternal laws or rebel against them. God was glorified no matter what man decided, because when man worshipped his Creator, God was magnified, and when man rebelled, he suffered consequences of the unalterable laws of God, and God was vindicated. When all men sinned in Adam, God decided to provide a Saviour for all men. The Saviour came from without the universal system, since it was the only way to save all who had rebelled against God. The Saviour was the only begotten Son of God. God provided a plan for all men: the Son of God died for all men, and salvation is offered to all men.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p139
“...Those who have failed to draw a distinction [between ethical and spiritual areas] have in some cases erroneously accused God of creating Satan’s desires. They argue that if God had not given him so much liberty and external beauty, Satan would not have started an insurgence. Those who endorse this syllogism fail to understand the nature of free will in relation to a free moral creature. God did not give Satan too much or too little of what he needed to avert his fall, nor did God allow a place for sin in His eternal decree. As suggested by [Lewis Sperry] Chafer, sin is the product of choice, not inherent weakness.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p361, 366
“God had to be sovereign over His plan, yet allow freedom within His plan. This involved a divine paradox: how could God remain an absolute Ruler of the universe, yet make man accountable to His plan? And even when man was given freedom, the plan of God had to bring glory to God, both in those who were rewarded for compliance with God’s plan and in punishment of those who rebelled against His plan.
“The decree of God is seen in the following. First, God decided to create a world that was good and beautiful. He decided that the universe would be stable and reflect the uniformity and regularity of laws that are the nature of His being. For it is through laws that god controls both man and the universe. Since laws are an extension of the nature of God, this is one way that God is everywhere present and makes everything accountable to Him. Next, God decided to create man in His image. God predetermined that man would have His nature, and man became the crowning act of creation. As such, man had freedom and autonomy, and in this wise decree, God decided to allow the freedom of His creatures to choose or reject His rule over them. Man could choose to live in harmony with God’s eternal laws or rebel against them. God was glorified no matter what man decided, because when man worshipped his Creator, God was magnified, and when man rebelled, he suffered consequences of the unalterable laws of God, and God was vindicated. When all men sinned in Adam, God decided to provide a Saviour for all men. The Saviour came from without the universal system, since it was the only way to save all who had rebelled against God. The Saviour was the only begotten Son of God. God provided a plan for all men: the Son of God died for all men, and salvation is offered to all men.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p139
“...Those who have failed to draw a distinction [between ethical and spiritual areas] have in some cases erroneously accused God of creating Satan’s desires. They argue that if God had not given him so much liberty and external beauty, Satan would not have started an insurgence. Those who endorse this syllogism fail to understand the nature of free will in relation to a free moral creature. God did not give Satan too much or too little of what he needed to avert his fall, nor did God allow a place for sin in His eternal decree. As suggested by [Lewis Sperry] Chafer, sin is the product of choice, not inherent weakness.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p361, 366
Lewis Sperry Chafer, American theologian, 1871-1952
“The decree of God anticipated all that would ever be; yet sin originates, not in the divine decree, but in the free act of the sinner. Sin is not in the constitution of creatures as they came from the creative hand of God, else all would sin. Sin is not an inherent weakness of the creature, else all would have failed. Sin is not a concomitant with free moral agency, else all free moral agents must fall. Dr. Gerhart, writing of the first sin, says: ‘Ego asserts itself against its own fundamental law, a fact for which no reason is to be assigned other than this, that the possibility of false choosing is a prerogative of finite autonomous being.’”
— Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology, Dallas Seminary Press, 1947 p31 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p366)
“The decree of God anticipated all that would ever be; yet sin originates, not in the divine decree, but in the free act of the sinner. Sin is not in the constitution of creatures as they came from the creative hand of God, else all would sin. Sin is not an inherent weakness of the creature, else all would have failed. Sin is not a concomitant with free moral agency, else all free moral agents must fall. Dr. Gerhart, writing of the first sin, says: ‘Ego asserts itself against its own fundamental law, a fact for which no reason is to be assigned other than this, that the possibility of false choosing is a prerogative of finite autonomous being.’”
— Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology, Dallas Seminary Press, 1947 p31 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p366)
Augustus Hopkins Strong, British minister & theologian, 1836-1921
“But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating man’s nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy. Reason, therefore, has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doctrine that sin originated in man’s free act of revolt from God – the act of a will which, though inclined toward God, was not yet confirmed in virtue and was still capable of a contrary choice. The original possession of such power to the contrary seems to be the necessary condition of probation and moral development. Yet, the exercise of this power in a sinful direction can never be explained upon grounds of reason, since sin is essentially unreason. It is an act of wicked arbitrariness, the only motive of which is the desire to depart from God and render self-supreme.”
— Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, Judson Press, 1907 p585-587 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p506)
“But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating man’s nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy. Reason, therefore, has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doctrine that sin originated in man’s free act of revolt from God – the act of a will which, though inclined toward God, was not yet confirmed in virtue and was still capable of a contrary choice. The original possession of such power to the contrary seems to be the necessary condition of probation and moral development. Yet, the exercise of this power in a sinful direction can never be explained upon grounds of reason, since sin is essentially unreason. It is an act of wicked arbitrariness, the only motive of which is the desire to depart from God and render self-supreme.”
— Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, Judson Press, 1907 p585-587 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p506)
Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, American professors of philosophy
“This argument about God and the possibility of evil has been disputed by theists such as Alvin Plantinga, who do not hold that God’s existence implies the existence of a maximally good world, but do hold that God seeks to create as good a world as he can. Theists such as Plantinga allow for there to be evil that is unnecessary for any greater good that outweighs it. An evil of this kind involves free decisions of non-divine agents, which God does not prevent, but which these other agents can prevent. Plantinga contends that God is not wrong to permit an evil of this kind, since God cannot bring about a vital good, the existence of free human agents, without there being such an evil. Alternatively, it might be argued that God does no wrong in this sort of case, because he does not know how to do better (knowledge of the future free actions of created agents being impossible). However, as an omnipotent God is not required to have power over the free decisions of non-divine agents, it follows that on these views, his omnipotence and moral perfection are compatible, roughly to the extent indicated earlier in our discussion of the view that God’s existence implies a maximally good world...“
— Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, “Omnipotence,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002
“This argument about God and the possibility of evil has been disputed by theists such as Alvin Plantinga, who do not hold that God’s existence implies the existence of a maximally good world, but do hold that God seeks to create as good a world as he can. Theists such as Plantinga allow for there to be evil that is unnecessary for any greater good that outweighs it. An evil of this kind involves free decisions of non-divine agents, which God does not prevent, but which these other agents can prevent. Plantinga contends that God is not wrong to permit an evil of this kind, since God cannot bring about a vital good, the existence of free human agents, without there being such an evil. Alternatively, it might be argued that God does no wrong in this sort of case, because he does not know how to do better (knowledge of the future free actions of created agents being impossible). However, as an omnipotent God is not required to have power over the free decisions of non-divine agents, it follows that on these views, his omnipotence and moral perfection are compatible, roughly to the extent indicated earlier in our discussion of the view that God’s existence implies a maximally good world...“
— Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, “Omnipotence,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002
Evil allows mankind opportunities to be good, or, God relies on human beings to accomplish good.
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“One conclusion then in this problem of suffering is that God is not the sole Operator. He permits it for wise reasons: He is more concerned with moral development than anything else. When Christ died in extreme agony, He did not bear the consequence of His own sin; He was unjustly condemned, and, unlike other men, could have escaped from His predicament (St. Matthew 26:53). He was the innocent willing Victim, and in dying bore the suffering as well as the sin of the world. It is in this sense that Christians often think of themselves as partakers in the sufferings of Christ (I Peter 4:13). It may help to serve our purpose if we tell here the story of an old woman who was paralyzed, bedridden and helpless. She lived in one room, and was entirely dependent in those days on the kindly services of neighbours. She could only expect and, one might think, hope for an early death. Yet she knew in her heart that God was good; she loved God, and so she was able to see in her sufferings, physical and mental, another side to the picture. Actually, people who were depressed or distressed in mind went to her, and they found comfort and assurance. The truth is that God transmutes suffering into a thing of blessing when rightly received.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p40
“One conclusion then in this problem of suffering is that God is not the sole Operator. He permits it for wise reasons: He is more concerned with moral development than anything else. When Christ died in extreme agony, He did not bear the consequence of His own sin; He was unjustly condemned, and, unlike other men, could have escaped from His predicament (St. Matthew 26:53). He was the innocent willing Victim, and in dying bore the suffering as well as the sin of the world. It is in this sense that Christians often think of themselves as partakers in the sufferings of Christ (I Peter 4:13). It may help to serve our purpose if we tell here the story of an old woman who was paralyzed, bedridden and helpless. She lived in one room, and was entirely dependent in those days on the kindly services of neighbours. She could only expect and, one might think, hope for an early death. Yet she knew in her heart that God was good; she loved God, and so she was able to see in her sufferings, physical and mental, another side to the picture. Actually, people who were depressed or distressed in mind went to her, and they found comfort and assurance. The truth is that God transmutes suffering into a thing of blessing when rightly received.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p40
Richard Swinburne, English philosopher, 1934-
“Suppose that one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic bomb. Then there would have been less opportunity for courage and sympathy...”
— Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford Press, 2004 p264 (quoted by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Mariner Books, 2008 p89, footnote)
“My suffering provides me with the opportunity to show courage and patience. It provides you with the opportunity to show sympathy and to help alleviate my suffering. And it provides society with the opportunity to choose whether or not to invest a lot of money in trying to find a cure for this or that particular kind of suffering. A good God gives us a deep responsibility for ourselves, each other, and the world (for whether and how we flourish); and the free choice of how to exercise that responsibility. And it is very good for us to have this responsibility. Although a good God regrets our suffering, his greatest concern is surely that each of us shall show patience, sympathy and generosity and, thereby, form a holy character. Some people badly need to be ill to provide important choices for others. Only in that way can some people be encouraged to make serious choices about the sort of person they are to be. For other people, illness is no so valuable.”
— Richard Swinburne, “Response to a Statistical Study of the Effect of Petitionary Prayer,” Science and Theology News, 7 April 2006 (quoted by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Mariner Books, 2008 p88-89)
“Suppose that one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic bomb. Then there would have been less opportunity for courage and sympathy...”
— Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford Press, 2004 p264 (quoted by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Mariner Books, 2008 p89, footnote)
“My suffering provides me with the opportunity to show courage and patience. It provides you with the opportunity to show sympathy and to help alleviate my suffering. And it provides society with the opportunity to choose whether or not to invest a lot of money in trying to find a cure for this or that particular kind of suffering. A good God gives us a deep responsibility for ourselves, each other, and the world (for whether and how we flourish); and the free choice of how to exercise that responsibility. And it is very good for us to have this responsibility. Although a good God regrets our suffering, his greatest concern is surely that each of us shall show patience, sympathy and generosity and, thereby, form a holy character. Some people badly need to be ill to provide important choices for others. Only in that way can some people be encouraged to make serious choices about the sort of person they are to be. For other people, illness is no so valuable.”
— Richard Swinburne, “Response to a Statistical Study of the Effect of Petitionary Prayer,” Science and Theology News, 7 April 2006 (quoted by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Mariner Books, 2008 p88-89)
Satan is the cause of evil in the world, not God.
Abhijit Naskar, Indian neuroscientist, 1991-
“Good and evil are both within us. And when our primitive ancestors humanized these natural qualities of the mind, they got two completely opposite supernatural characters. One was the merciful lord almighty and the other was the wicked devil.”
― Abhijit Naskar (source unknown)
“Good and evil are both within us. And when our primitive ancestors humanized these natural qualities of the mind, they got two completely opposite supernatural characters. One was the merciful lord almighty and the other was the wicked devil.”
― Abhijit Naskar (source unknown)
Elmer Leon Towns, American professor of theology & pastor, 1932-
“God is omnipotent (all-powerful). God is benevolent (all-loving). Evil exists in a world created by such a God.
“All three statements, examined individually, present truth. However, when juxtaposed, several internal problems arise. If indeed God is all-powerful, and His motives solely benevolent, why did He allow sin to occur? Either He is not all-powerful, His motives not totally pure, or sin does not really exist. The answers are not direct, but are implied in a greater question, ‘What was God’s purpose in allowing His creature to be tempted?’ The answer to these questions are inherent in the answer to the second difficulty. It relates to God’s allowing Satan to influence man to sin. God foreknew that Satan would seek to vent his anger toward him through the avenue of corrupting His creation, yet God chose not to hinder Satan’s plan. Initially one would conclude that God was insensitive to man. However, upon closer examination, such a claim represents the absence of sufficient knowledge.
“1. Temptation is never to be equated with sin. Adam’s sin stems directly from his desires and act to have what God forbade him to have.
“2. The nature of the prohibition was slight, yet sufficient to test the spirit of obedience.
“3. God had endowed Adam and Eve with the ability to reject the temptation (1 Cor. 10:13).
“4. Adam was commanded not to take of the Tree long before the temptation ever came. Adam fully understood what God expected of him.
“5. If God had thwarted Satan from tempting man, man’s loyalty would never have been determined – his infancy would have continued.
“6. Withholding Satan from man would have greatly thwarted man’s free will and the exercise of it, reducing him to nothing more than a puppet placed within a controlled environment.
“7. The nature of the command was not arbitrary or insignificant. It was concrete and substantive in nature, posing no anxiety within Adam and Eve.”
“In light of the aforementioned fact, the temptation of man cannot be viewed as a calloused acquiescence of God.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p507
“God could not have created anything evil. Originally, man was created in the image and likeness of God but fell into sin when Adam exercised his will in rebellion against God. Satan was also originally created as a being with power of personality and the freedom of choice. He was an angel with apparent honor and leadership in heaven. When Satan’s pride blinded him and led him to exercise his will in rebellion against God, he was cast out of heaven...
“Since his fall, Satan has become a zealot for propagating evil and immorality among the human race....”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p361, 363
“Many theologians discuss the origin of evil in relation to Adam and Eve while in the Garden of Eden. However, the actual origin of evil was not initiated on an earthly scene, but within the glories of heaven. Man was tempted by an external force. Although this does not make him any less guilty, it does suggest to us that evil was present in the universe prior to Genesis...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p365
“God is omnipotent (all-powerful). God is benevolent (all-loving). Evil exists in a world created by such a God.
“All three statements, examined individually, present truth. However, when juxtaposed, several internal problems arise. If indeed God is all-powerful, and His motives solely benevolent, why did He allow sin to occur? Either He is not all-powerful, His motives not totally pure, or sin does not really exist. The answers are not direct, but are implied in a greater question, ‘What was God’s purpose in allowing His creature to be tempted?’ The answer to these questions are inherent in the answer to the second difficulty. It relates to God’s allowing Satan to influence man to sin. God foreknew that Satan would seek to vent his anger toward him through the avenue of corrupting His creation, yet God chose not to hinder Satan’s plan. Initially one would conclude that God was insensitive to man. However, upon closer examination, such a claim represents the absence of sufficient knowledge.
“1. Temptation is never to be equated with sin. Adam’s sin stems directly from his desires and act to have what God forbade him to have.
“2. The nature of the prohibition was slight, yet sufficient to test the spirit of obedience.
“3. God had endowed Adam and Eve with the ability to reject the temptation (1 Cor. 10:13).
“4. Adam was commanded not to take of the Tree long before the temptation ever came. Adam fully understood what God expected of him.
“5. If God had thwarted Satan from tempting man, man’s loyalty would never have been determined – his infancy would have continued.
“6. Withholding Satan from man would have greatly thwarted man’s free will and the exercise of it, reducing him to nothing more than a puppet placed within a controlled environment.
“7. The nature of the command was not arbitrary or insignificant. It was concrete and substantive in nature, posing no anxiety within Adam and Eve.”
“In light of the aforementioned fact, the temptation of man cannot be viewed as a calloused acquiescence of God.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p507
“God could not have created anything evil. Originally, man was created in the image and likeness of God but fell into sin when Adam exercised his will in rebellion against God. Satan was also originally created as a being with power of personality and the freedom of choice. He was an angel with apparent honor and leadership in heaven. When Satan’s pride blinded him and led him to exercise his will in rebellion against God, he was cast out of heaven...
“Since his fall, Satan has become a zealot for propagating evil and immorality among the human race....”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p361, 363
“Many theologians discuss the origin of evil in relation to Adam and Eve while in the Garden of Eden. However, the actual origin of evil was not initiated on an earthly scene, but within the glories of heaven. Man was tempted by an external force. Although this does not make him any less guilty, it does suggest to us that evil was present in the universe prior to Genesis...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p365
Lewis Sperry Chafer, American theologian, 1871-1952
“The fall of this mighty angel [Satan] was not a compromise between good and evil. He became the embodiment of evil and wholly void of good. The essential wickedness of this being could not be estimated by the finite mind. His wickedness, however, is constructive and in line with vast undertakings and ideas which are evil because of their opposition to God.”
— Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology, Dallas Seminary Press, 1947 p35 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p363)
“The fall of this mighty angel [Satan] was not a compromise between good and evil. He became the embodiment of evil and wholly void of good. The essential wickedness of this being could not be estimated by the finite mind. His wickedness, however, is constructive and in line with vast undertakings and ideas which are evil because of their opposition to God.”
— Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology, Dallas Seminary Press, 1947 p35 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p363)
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor
“No problem of injustice seems to arise when we observe what we feel to be deserved suffering. It is the undeserved suffering of the innocent that leads men to question the goodness of God, and even to doubt His existence. To a large extent, war involves this problem, and it is noteworthy that after each of the world wars in the first half of the twentieth century a marked decline in faith followed. Yet others, including ourselves, who took part in these conflicts came out with strengthened faith and unwavering trust in the power of God in limiting evil. There is no doubt that suffering can take on acute and extremely drawn out forms, and that those who have to bear it cannot be blamed for its incidence. Christ came out emphatically against those who said in His time that all suffering is a consequence of personal sin on the part of the sufferer or his forebears (St. Luke 13:2-5; St. John 9:2,3). It may indeed be caused by personal license and excesses, but there is a large residuum which cannot be explained in this way. In some cases, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the cruelties witnessed and experienced have a mark of an actually malevolent source.
“Once we admit the possible presence of evil and of an evil Spirit in the world of a God who Himself is absolute Goodness, we immediately discern a possible explanation. If Satan is the cause of suffering, we would expect him not particularly to afflict his own; he would be more likely to single out the better men and women of the world, and those who have some faith in God, hoping that they will attribute their misfortunes to God, and that they will be shaken in their belief. If we think the idea of Satan is a myth, or if we blame God for his actions, the more the Prince of Darkness will exult at what is (to him) a comical situation. It will be even funnier if he can get people to believe that the conception of God is a fiction or a form of pious dope. Let us be bold, and accept the only sensible solution in attributing all the suffering, as well as all the sin in the world, to its sole cause, that old Devil who for so long has deceived the nations and thrown dust in the eyes of the people of the world.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p37-38
“No problem of injustice seems to arise when we observe what we feel to be deserved suffering. It is the undeserved suffering of the innocent that leads men to question the goodness of God, and even to doubt His existence. To a large extent, war involves this problem, and it is noteworthy that after each of the world wars in the first half of the twentieth century a marked decline in faith followed. Yet others, including ourselves, who took part in these conflicts came out with strengthened faith and unwavering trust in the power of God in limiting evil. There is no doubt that suffering can take on acute and extremely drawn out forms, and that those who have to bear it cannot be blamed for its incidence. Christ came out emphatically against those who said in His time that all suffering is a consequence of personal sin on the part of the sufferer or his forebears (St. Luke 13:2-5; St. John 9:2,3). It may indeed be caused by personal license and excesses, but there is a large residuum which cannot be explained in this way. In some cases, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the cruelties witnessed and experienced have a mark of an actually malevolent source.
“Once we admit the possible presence of evil and of an evil Spirit in the world of a God who Himself is absolute Goodness, we immediately discern a possible explanation. If Satan is the cause of suffering, we would expect him not particularly to afflict his own; he would be more likely to single out the better men and women of the world, and those who have some faith in God, hoping that they will attribute their misfortunes to God, and that they will be shaken in their belief. If we think the idea of Satan is a myth, or if we blame God for his actions, the more the Prince of Darkness will exult at what is (to him) a comical situation. It will be even funnier if he can get people to believe that the conception of God is a fiction or a form of pious dope. Let us be bold, and accept the only sensible solution in attributing all the suffering, as well as all the sin in the world, to its sole cause, that old Devil who for so long has deceived the nations and thrown dust in the eyes of the people of the world.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p37-38
Evil is the absence of God.
Walter Bauer, German theologian, lexicographer of the New Testament, and scholar of early Christianity, 1877-1960
“Evil is what is finite; for the finite is negative, the negation of the infinite. Everything finite is relatively nothing a negativity which, in the constant distinction of plus and minus of reality, appears in different forms. Again, if freedom from sin is the removal of all limitation, so is it clear, that only an endless series of gradations can bring us to the point where sin is reduced to a vanished minimum. If this minimum should entirely disappear, then the being, thus entirely free from sin, becomes one with God, for God only is absolutely sinless. But if other beings than God are to exist, there must be in them, so far as they are not infinite as God is, for that very reason, a minimum of evil.”
— Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, Fortress, 1934 p251 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p513)
“Evil is what is finite; for the finite is negative, the negation of the infinite. Everything finite is relatively nothing a negativity which, in the constant distinction of plus and minus of reality, appears in different forms. Again, if freedom from sin is the removal of all limitation, so is it clear, that only an endless series of gradations can bring us to the point where sin is reduced to a vanished minimum. If this minimum should entirely disappear, then the being, thus entirely free from sin, becomes one with God, for God only is absolutely sinless. But if other beings than God are to exist, there must be in them, so far as they are not infinite as God is, for that very reason, a minimum of evil.”
— Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, Fortress, 1934 p251 (quoted by Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p513)
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“...If God is Love, He must be infinite Love, and must have someone to love, or else remain in splendid isolation, which would not be an attribute of pure love. If by His thought He brings other beings into existence as objects of His love, they must be creatures lower than Himself. If they were to love Him in return for His love to them, they must will to do so, and He must impart some of His will to them. In evolutionary terms we may say that animal instinct became in man replaced by will. Man was then at the cross-roads: he inherited an animal ancestry, but now had higher possibilities of an approach to God. From the angle of revelation, he was able to defeat God’s purpose of progress to some extent, and Satan at his ear tempted him to try. The process of evolution was not one of constant progress upwards; there were lapses, but the overall result was towards improvement. It may be that only by conquest of evil can good triumph in the end. We are looking at an unfinished picture where the Artist’s intention is not yet complete. We believe that God never ceases in His efforts to win man over to fulfill His grand design of eternal Love.
“Our author [Bertrand Russell] refers here to the defects of the world, and asks if we who believe in God do not find it astonishing that it is the best world that omnipotence and omniscience has been able to produce in millions of years. He does not specify what particular defects he has in mind, apart from a reference to the Ku-Klux Klan and to Fascists. If our author finds that these movements militate against belief in a God of power and knowledge, he ought, we think in fairness, to argue for the existence of such a God in view of their ultimate suppression or decay. They each exhibit forms of extreme nationalism and slavery of the human spirit. Their existence can be reconciled with the attributes assigned to God by our previous argument, as consequences of the existence of evil arising from human abuse of freewill.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p28
“...If God is Love, He must be infinite Love, and must have someone to love, or else remain in splendid isolation, which would not be an attribute of pure love. If by His thought He brings other beings into existence as objects of His love, they must be creatures lower than Himself. If they were to love Him in return for His love to them, they must will to do so, and He must impart some of His will to them. In evolutionary terms we may say that animal instinct became in man replaced by will. Man was then at the cross-roads: he inherited an animal ancestry, but now had higher possibilities of an approach to God. From the angle of revelation, he was able to defeat God’s purpose of progress to some extent, and Satan at his ear tempted him to try. The process of evolution was not one of constant progress upwards; there were lapses, but the overall result was towards improvement. It may be that only by conquest of evil can good triumph in the end. We are looking at an unfinished picture where the Artist’s intention is not yet complete. We believe that God never ceases in His efforts to win man over to fulfill His grand design of eternal Love.
“Our author [Bertrand Russell] refers here to the defects of the world, and asks if we who believe in God do not find it astonishing that it is the best world that omnipotence and omniscience has been able to produce in millions of years. He does not specify what particular defects he has in mind, apart from a reference to the Ku-Klux Klan and to Fascists. If our author finds that these movements militate against belief in a God of power and knowledge, he ought, we think in fairness, to argue for the existence of such a God in view of their ultimate suppression or decay. They each exhibit forms of extreme nationalism and slavery of the human spirit. Their existence can be reconciled with the attributes assigned to God by our previous argument, as consequences of the existence of evil arising from human abuse of freewill.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p28
The existence of evil proves God, because we have a sense of justice, a feeling of being against evil.
C.S. Lewis, British writer and lay-theologian, 1898-1963
“My argument against God [as an atheist] was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust? If the whole show was bad and senseless from A to Z, so to speak, why did I, who was supposed to be part of the show, find myself in such violent reaction against it? A man feels wet when he falls into water, because man is not a water animal: a fish would not feel wet. Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too–for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies. Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist–in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless–I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality–namely my idea of justice–was full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple. If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning; just as, if there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be a word without meaning.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p41
“My argument against God [as an atheist] was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust? If the whole show was bad and senseless from A to Z, so to speak, why did I, who was supposed to be part of the show, find myself in such violent reaction against it? A man feels wet when he falls into water, because man is not a water animal: a fish would not feel wet. Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too–for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies. Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist–in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless–I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality–namely my idea of justice–was full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple. If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning; just as, if there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be a word without meaning.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p41
There is more good in the world than bad.
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“The arguments advanced against belief in God can evidently all be reversed more forcibly in favour of faith. We have been asked to explain the existence of evil in God’s good world, and this we have attempted to do. But may we not ask why there is so much more beauty than ugliness, more love than hate, and more goodness than evil in the world? When our faith in God is put to the test in prayer and worship and when sometimes He speaks to us we do not need further proof of His Real Presence.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p42
DIRECT ARGUMENTS
“The arguments advanced against belief in God can evidently all be reversed more forcibly in favour of faith. We have been asked to explain the existence of evil in God’s good world, and this we have attempted to do. But may we not ask why there is so much more beauty than ugliness, more love than hate, and more goodness than evil in the world? When our faith in God is put to the test in prayer and worship and when sometimes He speaks to us we do not need further proof of His Real Presence.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p42
3. Rebuttal:
The Christian God is himself immoral
The Christian God is himself immoral
Summary:
According to the Bible, the actions and commandments of God himself (and his representative prophets) would be considered unconscionable by today’s standards, including human sacrifice, hate, and genocide. God cannot be both benevolent and have done these acts which caused so much suffering against innocents.
Elmer Leon Towns, American professor of theology & pastor, 1932-
“A final difficulty related to the Fall centers on the severity of one sin. Should one act of disobedience lead to such harsh consequences as spiritual death, expulsion from the garden, the beginning of physical death, increased labor and birth pains, and loss of daily fellowship with God? These all appear to be too harsh for committing only one sin. In man’s eyes, such a penalty may appear to be unjust. However, from God’s perspective, sin demanded a terrible penalty, as evidence [sic] by the Cross, and not in the garden.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p508
“A final difficulty related to the Fall centers on the severity of one sin. Should one act of disobedience lead to such harsh consequences as spiritual death, expulsion from the garden, the beginning of physical death, increased labor and birth pains, and loss of daily fellowship with God? These all appear to be too harsh for committing only one sin. In man’s eyes, such a penalty may appear to be unjust. However, from God’s perspective, sin demanded a terrible penalty, as evidence [sic] by the Cross, and not in the garden.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p508
4. Rebuttal:
Argument from Free Will
Argument from Free Will
Summary:
Contradictions exist between the ideas of free will and an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent god. (Not to be confused with the Omnipotence Paradox or the Free Will Defense to the Problem of Evil.)
Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, American professors of philosophy
“One can respond to arguments of this kind as follows. Assume that if God exists, then this is a best possible world. In that case, if God exists, there could not be an evil unless it were necessary for some greater good, in which case any state of affairs containing evil incompatible with there being a maximally good world is impossible. But it be may be [sic] assumed that it is not possible for any agent to bring about an impossible state of affairs. Thus, if God exists, any moral evil, that is, any evil brought about by anyone, and any natural evil, or any evil which has an impersonal, natural cause, must be necessary for some greater good.
“Suppose that God exists and that some other person, for example, Cain, brings it about that an evil, E, exists. There are two possibilities that need to be considered here. The first is that Cain’s decisions and actions are causally determined, as are all occurrences in the created universe. Then, given our assumptions, since Cain’s bringing it about that E exists is necessary for some good which more than compensates for E’s existence, it is consistent with God’s moral perfection that God (remotely) brings it about that Cain brings it about that E exists.
“The second possibility is that Cain’s decision to do evil is uncaused by anything other than Cain and free in the libertarian sense. In that case, God did not (remotely cause Cain freely to) bring it about that E exists, while (let us assume) Cain did freely bring it about that E exists. If so, then it must be the case that God’s creating Cain and permitting Cain freely to do what he chooses to do (in the context of the entire creation) brings about more good than his not creating Cain and thus not permitting him freely to do what he chooses to do. It might be objected that if Cain can bring about a state of affairs that God cannot, namely, that E exists, then God is not omnipotent. But, as we have seen, an agent’s being omnipotent does not require of that agent that it be able to bring about every state of affairs which any other agent can bring about. It does, of course, require that an omnipotent agent have more power than any other agent. And God, of course, would have more power than Cain, even though Cain could bring about something that God could not. For there are many more states of affairs that God could bring about and that Cain could not, than vice versa. At this point, it might further be objected that an omnipotent agent, one that was morally imperfect, who could bring it about that E exists, as well as all the other states of affairs that God could bring about, would be more powerful than God. But recall that if God exists, then he exists eternally in every possible world. Recall, too, that there cannot be more than one omnipotent agent. Thus, if God exists, then an omnipotent agent who is morally imperfect is impossible. Thus, this second objection is based on an assumption that is impossible, namely, that if God exists there could exist another omnipotent agent who is morally imperfect and who is therefore more powerful than God.
“Of course, if God exists, then any evil state of affairs, s, which is incompatible with a maximally good world is impossible. And if s is impossible, then neither God nor any other agent has the power to bring it about that s obtains. God would lack the power to bring it about that s obtains because of his moral perfection, and any created agent would lack the power to bring it about that s obtains either because (i) God would not create an agent who had the power to bring it about that s obtains, or (ii) God would not permit any created agent to bring it about that s obtains. Thus, to the extent indicated, if God’s attributes impose moral restrictions on the nature of the universe and on what he can bring about, then they impose parallel restrictions on what any other agents can bring about.
“The foregoing line of reasoning implies that God’s moral perfection and omnipotence are not incompatible.”
— Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, “Omnipotence,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002
“One can respond to arguments of this kind as follows. Assume that if God exists, then this is a best possible world. In that case, if God exists, there could not be an evil unless it were necessary for some greater good, in which case any state of affairs containing evil incompatible with there being a maximally good world is impossible. But it be may be [sic] assumed that it is not possible for any agent to bring about an impossible state of affairs. Thus, if God exists, any moral evil, that is, any evil brought about by anyone, and any natural evil, or any evil which has an impersonal, natural cause, must be necessary for some greater good.
“Suppose that God exists and that some other person, for example, Cain, brings it about that an evil, E, exists. There are two possibilities that need to be considered here. The first is that Cain’s decisions and actions are causally determined, as are all occurrences in the created universe. Then, given our assumptions, since Cain’s bringing it about that E exists is necessary for some good which more than compensates for E’s existence, it is consistent with God’s moral perfection that God (remotely) brings it about that Cain brings it about that E exists.
“The second possibility is that Cain’s decision to do evil is uncaused by anything other than Cain and free in the libertarian sense. In that case, God did not (remotely cause Cain freely to) bring it about that E exists, while (let us assume) Cain did freely bring it about that E exists. If so, then it must be the case that God’s creating Cain and permitting Cain freely to do what he chooses to do (in the context of the entire creation) brings about more good than his not creating Cain and thus not permitting him freely to do what he chooses to do. It might be objected that if Cain can bring about a state of affairs that God cannot, namely, that E exists, then God is not omnipotent. But, as we have seen, an agent’s being omnipotent does not require of that agent that it be able to bring about every state of affairs which any other agent can bring about. It does, of course, require that an omnipotent agent have more power than any other agent. And God, of course, would have more power than Cain, even though Cain could bring about something that God could not. For there are many more states of affairs that God could bring about and that Cain could not, than vice versa. At this point, it might further be objected that an omnipotent agent, one that was morally imperfect, who could bring it about that E exists, as well as all the other states of affairs that God could bring about, would be more powerful than God. But recall that if God exists, then he exists eternally in every possible world. Recall, too, that there cannot be more than one omnipotent agent. Thus, if God exists, then an omnipotent agent who is morally imperfect is impossible. Thus, this second objection is based on an assumption that is impossible, namely, that if God exists there could exist another omnipotent agent who is morally imperfect and who is therefore more powerful than God.
“Of course, if God exists, then any evil state of affairs, s, which is incompatible with a maximally good world is impossible. And if s is impossible, then neither God nor any other agent has the power to bring it about that s obtains. God would lack the power to bring it about that s obtains because of his moral perfection, and any created agent would lack the power to bring it about that s obtains either because (i) God would not create an agent who had the power to bring it about that s obtains, or (ii) God would not permit any created agent to bring it about that s obtains. Thus, to the extent indicated, if God’s attributes impose moral restrictions on the nature of the universe and on what he can bring about, then they impose parallel restrictions on what any other agents can bring about.
“The foregoing line of reasoning implies that God’s moral perfection and omnipotence are not incompatible.”
— Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, “Omnipotence,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002
Elmer Leon Towns, American professor of theology & pastor, 1932-
“...God can do everything that is in harmony with His nature and perfection. Of all the attributes of God, God has limited His omnipotence by His will. He can do whatever he wills to do, but He does not necessarily will to do everything. On many occasions, God has limited His power by the free will of His rational creatures. By this God does not force people to become Christians, therefore, He limits His power by the rejection of their will. God could have exercised His power to keep sin out of the universe, but that would have been inconsistent with the nature of His created beings. Therefore, God limited His power to allow sin to enter the world.
“God’s will controls His power, otherwise, God’s power would act out of necessity and He would cease being a free being. [Louis] Berkhof [in Systematic Theology] suggests, ‘Power in God may be called the effective energy of His nature, or that perfection of His Being by which He is the absolute and highest causality.’...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p121
“God’s power is potentially unlimited. Not only can God do impossible things (such as raising the dead), God does improbable things (such as walking on the water, John 6:19). God has the potential to do anything He wills. The Bible teaches, ‘With God all things are possible.’ (Matt. 19:26).“But when we analyze the omnipotence of God, we realize at times God is limited. He will not do things which are contrary to His nature. God cannot look on sin (Hab. 1:13), deny His existence (2 Tim. 2:13), lie (Heb. 6:18), nor be tempted to sin. These things are against His nature (Jas. 1:13). Even though God is all-powerful to do everything that is in harmony with His nature, He cannot go contrary to His nature nor deny His being. God cannot make a square circle, nor can He make a true myth.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p121-122
“...God can do everything that is in harmony with His nature and perfection. Of all the attributes of God, God has limited His omnipotence by His will. He can do whatever he wills to do, but He does not necessarily will to do everything. On many occasions, God has limited His power by the free will of His rational creatures. By this God does not force people to become Christians, therefore, He limits His power by the rejection of their will. God could have exercised His power to keep sin out of the universe, but that would have been inconsistent with the nature of His created beings. Therefore, God limited His power to allow sin to enter the world.
“God’s will controls His power, otherwise, God’s power would act out of necessity and He would cease being a free being. [Louis] Berkhof [in Systematic Theology] suggests, ‘Power in God may be called the effective energy of His nature, or that perfection of His Being by which He is the absolute and highest causality.’...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p121
“God’s power is potentially unlimited. Not only can God do impossible things (such as raising the dead), God does improbable things (such as walking on the water, John 6:19). God has the potential to do anything He wills. The Bible teaches, ‘With God all things are possible.’ (Matt. 19:26).“But when we analyze the omnipotence of God, we realize at times God is limited. He will not do things which are contrary to His nature. God cannot look on sin (Hab. 1:13), deny His existence (2 Tim. 2:13), lie (Heb. 6:18), nor be tempted to sin. These things are against His nature (Jas. 1:13). Even though God is all-powerful to do everything that is in harmony with His nature, He cannot go contrary to His nature nor deny His being. God cannot make a square circle, nor can He make a true myth.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p121-122
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“A logical dilemma is here proposed which transfers attention from God’s existence to His nature. We agree that these two ideas are closely interlinked. We are asked about the origin of the difference between right and wrong. Did the difference originate with God? If we attribute pure goodness to Him, He cannot be the Source of evil. Neither can good and evil have anteceded Him. Whatever way we look at it, the problem bristles with difficulties. The rationalist does not escape it by denying God’s existence.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p31
“A logical dilemma is here proposed which transfers attention from God’s existence to His nature. We agree that these two ideas are closely interlinked. We are asked about the origin of the difference between right and wrong. Did the difference originate with God? If we attribute pure goodness to Him, He cannot be the Source of evil. Neither can good and evil have anteceded Him. Whatever way we look at it, the problem bristles with difficulties. The rationalist does not escape it by denying God’s existence.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p31
Jerome I. Gellman, Israeli professor of philosophy, 1940-
“...We have in mind what is expressed, for example, by Sartre, which can be stated baldly in argument form as follows:
“(1) If God exists then I, Sartre, am not free to choose myself.
“(2) But, I, Sartre, am free to choose himself.
“(3) Hence, God does not exist.
“In this argument, God’s existence is portrayed as antithetical to a person’s freedom, not in the sense in which a person is free to choose between alternative actions, such as moving her finger or refraining from doing so, but free from having an ‘essence,’ free from having a plan for her imposed from without her own being, and thus free to choose herself.
“What is Sartre’s evidence that (2) is true? If he has no evidence for thinking that he, Sartre, is free to choose himself, but states this as a basic belief or outlook of his on life, then maybe, granting (1) in the meantime, Sartre has a reason for thinking that God does not exist. But that reason does not count as evidence against God’s existence, in the sense that concerns us in this study.
“But let us not be dogmatic about this. Perhaps Sartre has evidence for the truth of (2) perhaps, for example, Sartre seems to experience his freedom, seems to experience himself as one who is free to choose himself, and so on BEE [Best Explanation of Experience] it is rational to conclude that everything else being equal Sartre is free to choose himself. And so perhaps Sartre has evidence that God does not exist.
“But even were we to concede that Sartre seems to experience his own freedom to choose himself, and even if we were to grant (1), that is, concede that God’s existence was thereby contradicted, this still would be negligible evidence against the existence of God compared to the relatively massive evidence that God is experienced, and so exists. Sartre’s reasoning would be successful only if the number of person’s allegedly experiencing themselves as free to choose themselves in Sartre’s sense, a sense that implies God’s nonexistence, and the variability of conditions in which these occurred, were impressive relative to the evidential value of alleged experiences of God. But this hardly seems to be the case. The evidence for Sartre’s first premise is negligible at best.
“A Sartre supporter might reply that in fact every person has an experience of his own freedom to choose himself, but that many are prone to deny this out of self-deception of ‘bad faith.’ But this reply would render Sartre’s argument less a matter of having discovered evidence against God’s existence and more a matter of combatting God’s existence by way of a theory or world-view in which it has no place. The theory would have to be argued for in a convincing way, and it is a controversial matter whether this has ever been done.
“Even granting (2), however, Sartre’s argument does not establish the nonexistence of God, because (1) cannot be granted. And that is because our lack of freedom, in Sartre’s sense, would follow, if at all, not from the very existence of God, but from that together with certain auxiliary premises taken from religious teachings about why God has created us, how God regards us, and that He has plans for us. These religious doctrines aside, we see no difficulty in supposing that God creates each of us, to borrow Sartre’s phrase, as a ‘hole in the heart of being,’ each of us having to choose, in some important sense, our own ‘project.’ If there is a contradiction between God’s existence and agency to choose oneself it has to be argued for in a much more convincing way than Sartre or others have ever done.”
— Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, Cornell University Press, 1997 p157-158
“...We have in mind what is expressed, for example, by Sartre, which can be stated baldly in argument form as follows:
“(1) If God exists then I, Sartre, am not free to choose myself.
“(2) But, I, Sartre, am free to choose himself.
“(3) Hence, God does not exist.
“In this argument, God’s existence is portrayed as antithetical to a person’s freedom, not in the sense in which a person is free to choose between alternative actions, such as moving her finger or refraining from doing so, but free from having an ‘essence,’ free from having a plan for her imposed from without her own being, and thus free to choose herself.
“What is Sartre’s evidence that (2) is true? If he has no evidence for thinking that he, Sartre, is free to choose himself, but states this as a basic belief or outlook of his on life, then maybe, granting (1) in the meantime, Sartre has a reason for thinking that God does not exist. But that reason does not count as evidence against God’s existence, in the sense that concerns us in this study.
“But let us not be dogmatic about this. Perhaps Sartre has evidence for the truth of (2) perhaps, for example, Sartre seems to experience his freedom, seems to experience himself as one who is free to choose himself, and so on BEE [Best Explanation of Experience] it is rational to conclude that everything else being equal Sartre is free to choose himself. And so perhaps Sartre has evidence that God does not exist.
“But even were we to concede that Sartre seems to experience his own freedom to choose himself, and even if we were to grant (1), that is, concede that God’s existence was thereby contradicted, this still would be negligible evidence against the existence of God compared to the relatively massive evidence that God is experienced, and so exists. Sartre’s reasoning would be successful only if the number of person’s allegedly experiencing themselves as free to choose themselves in Sartre’s sense, a sense that implies God’s nonexistence, and the variability of conditions in which these occurred, were impressive relative to the evidential value of alleged experiences of God. But this hardly seems to be the case. The evidence for Sartre’s first premise is negligible at best.
“A Sartre supporter might reply that in fact every person has an experience of his own freedom to choose himself, but that many are prone to deny this out of self-deception of ‘bad faith.’ But this reply would render Sartre’s argument less a matter of having discovered evidence against God’s existence and more a matter of combatting God’s existence by way of a theory or world-view in which it has no place. The theory would have to be argued for in a convincing way, and it is a controversial matter whether this has ever been done.
“Even granting (2), however, Sartre’s argument does not establish the nonexistence of God, because (1) cannot be granted. And that is because our lack of freedom, in Sartre’s sense, would follow, if at all, not from the very existence of God, but from that together with certain auxiliary premises taken from religious teachings about why God has created us, how God regards us, and that He has plans for us. These religious doctrines aside, we see no difficulty in supposing that God creates each of us, to borrow Sartre’s phrase, as a ‘hole in the heart of being,’ each of us having to choose, in some important sense, our own ‘project.’ If there is a contradiction between God’s existence and agency to choose oneself it has to be argued for in a much more convincing way than Sartre or others have ever done.”
— Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, Cornell University Press, 1997 p157-158
5. Rebuttal:
Argument from Suppression of Information
Argument from Suppression of Information
Summary:
Theism has traditionally suppressed knowledge and ethical progress, or may even promote unethical behaviors as if they are good, and this itself is immoral.
No Content Yet
“No Content Yet"
― No Content Yet
“No Content Yet"
― No Content Yet
6. Rebuttal:
Belief in God is used to justify tyranny and injustice in society
Belief in God is used to justify tyranny and injustice in society
Summary:
Theism based on moral authority centers “the ends justify any means” reasoning. Religious leaders stand as exclusive moral authorities who have full, unquestioned control of a society’s ethics. Since God has not stepped in to correct the inevitable injustices, the power of clergy operates unchecked.
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“It seems to us that [Bertrand Russell] was on safe ground so long as he based his reasoning on the Christ of the Gospels as His chroniclers represent Him. He can only make his point as to why he is not a Christian if he can show that Christ’s teaching was inhumane, and that His followers have not been concerned about social problems and conditions. It is safe to say that he can prove none of these things. The truth lies in the exactly opposite direction. Let us take points mentioned by our author. It was a Christian, George Fox, founder of the Society of Friends, who three hundred years ago heralded the present detestation of war. Christians generally have been the greatest workers for peace, though not at any price: thus many of them thought it right to take up arms against Hitler. Father Huddleston has become associated with opposition to the policy of apartheid in South Africa. But it is on the point of slavery that the Church has made the greatest contributions to reform. It was early Christianity which made life tolerable for the Grecian slaves, and in the nineteenth century the attack on the slave trade was led by the Christian William Wilberforce of the much despised ‘Clapham Sect.’ Other Christians, such as Zachary Macaulay, gave him assistance. Wilberforce gradually gained the support of his friend Pitt and saw some of the results of his work in the Act of 1807 which abolished the traffic in slaves. The Bill for the complete emancipation of West Indian negroes was passed, largely as a result of his appeals, a few days after his death in 1833. All slaves were released by 1838. John Wesley, the founder of the present Methodist Church, had attacked the evil in his Thoughts upon Slavery. The last letter he wrote was to Wilberforce: in it he said: ‘Go on, in the name of God and in the power of His might, till even American slavery (the vilest that ever saw the sun) shall vanish away before it.’ Christians have proved the greatest force in the world for spreading love and brotherhood amongst the nations, and by bringing the Gospel to the darkest corners of the earth have lightened the load, sweetened the lives and satisfied not only the temporal but also the deeper spiritual needs of a countless host of humanity. This marks the supreme achievement of Christ’s true Church.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p64-65
“We have seen that the Churches have not always effectively interpreted the mind of Christ. Even so, they have proved a great force of purification in the world. We must not blame Christianity for men’s failure to follow its message. In spite of many difficulties within and without her boundaries, the Christian Church can claim some solid achievements, as in raising the status of woman, freeing the slaves and in assisting the rehabilitation of refugees.
“When he charges the Churches with initiating cruelties, our author might recall that Attila, Hitler and Nero were not Christians, and if they had been they would not have acted as they did. When the Churches allowed fervour to degenerate into fanaticism they were not following their supposed Master. To make his case, [Bertrand Russell] must prove that Christ taught His followers to win His Kingdom with the sword. He cannot do this. Fielding once said that philosophy could make us wiser, but Christianity could make us better men. Action follows conviction rather than knowledge.
“Our author seems to realize that something is needed beyond the possibilities of science to make the world a better place when he speaks of ‘our own hearts.’ What he means by the phrase, however, is not the new heart that Christ came to give, but reliance on our own efforts. Modern history teaches very clearly that we cannot save ourselves by our unaided struggles...
“At the beginning of the twentieth century hope ran high. After a long history with marked advances in science, our country seemed heading for a happier and more comfortable future. Instead of an era of prosperity and peace, the world was fated to suffer two global wars. Man forgot that without God he must surely come to disaster...”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p70-72
“It seems to us that [Bertrand Russell] was on safe ground so long as he based his reasoning on the Christ of the Gospels as His chroniclers represent Him. He can only make his point as to why he is not a Christian if he can show that Christ’s teaching was inhumane, and that His followers have not been concerned about social problems and conditions. It is safe to say that he can prove none of these things. The truth lies in the exactly opposite direction. Let us take points mentioned by our author. It was a Christian, George Fox, founder of the Society of Friends, who three hundred years ago heralded the present detestation of war. Christians generally have been the greatest workers for peace, though not at any price: thus many of them thought it right to take up arms against Hitler. Father Huddleston has become associated with opposition to the policy of apartheid in South Africa. But it is on the point of slavery that the Church has made the greatest contributions to reform. It was early Christianity which made life tolerable for the Grecian slaves, and in the nineteenth century the attack on the slave trade was led by the Christian William Wilberforce of the much despised ‘Clapham Sect.’ Other Christians, such as Zachary Macaulay, gave him assistance. Wilberforce gradually gained the support of his friend Pitt and saw some of the results of his work in the Act of 1807 which abolished the traffic in slaves. The Bill for the complete emancipation of West Indian negroes was passed, largely as a result of his appeals, a few days after his death in 1833. All slaves were released by 1838. John Wesley, the founder of the present Methodist Church, had attacked the evil in his Thoughts upon Slavery. The last letter he wrote was to Wilberforce: in it he said: ‘Go on, in the name of God and in the power of His might, till even American slavery (the vilest that ever saw the sun) shall vanish away before it.’ Christians have proved the greatest force in the world for spreading love and brotherhood amongst the nations, and by bringing the Gospel to the darkest corners of the earth have lightened the load, sweetened the lives and satisfied not only the temporal but also the deeper spiritual needs of a countless host of humanity. This marks the supreme achievement of Christ’s true Church.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p64-65
“We have seen that the Churches have not always effectively interpreted the mind of Christ. Even so, they have proved a great force of purification in the world. We must not blame Christianity for men’s failure to follow its message. In spite of many difficulties within and without her boundaries, the Christian Church can claim some solid achievements, as in raising the status of woman, freeing the slaves and in assisting the rehabilitation of refugees.
“When he charges the Churches with initiating cruelties, our author might recall that Attila, Hitler and Nero were not Christians, and if they had been they would not have acted as they did. When the Churches allowed fervour to degenerate into fanaticism they were not following their supposed Master. To make his case, [Bertrand Russell] must prove that Christ taught His followers to win His Kingdom with the sword. He cannot do this. Fielding once said that philosophy could make us wiser, but Christianity could make us better men. Action follows conviction rather than knowledge.
“Our author seems to realize that something is needed beyond the possibilities of science to make the world a better place when he speaks of ‘our own hearts.’ What he means by the phrase, however, is not the new heart that Christ came to give, but reliance on our own efforts. Modern history teaches very clearly that we cannot save ourselves by our unaided struggles...
“At the beginning of the twentieth century hope ran high. After a long history with marked advances in science, our country seemed heading for a happier and more comfortable future. Instead of an era of prosperity and peace, the world was fated to suffer two global wars. Man forgot that without God he must surely come to disaster...”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p70-72
Jerome I. Gellman, Israeli professor of philosophy, 1940-
“...In the second half of the twentieth century a moral sensibility has arisen which judges various aspects of traditional theistic religions to be morally unacceptable or repugnant. We include in this category a feminist consciousness which condemns as immoral the way in which women have been neglected or subjugated within traditional religious behavior and theologies. And we include as well a universalist thinking which finds particularistic moral codes or teachings, allegedly displayed by some traditional religions, to be morally reprehensible.
“But even were we to embrace these moral assessments, we would have no reason whatever to conclude that God did not exist. The most that could be argued would be that if God is really wholly good then the offensive scriptural passages, religious doctrines, attitudes, and practices could not have really come from God. It would not follow in the least that God did not exist. If one did draw such a conclusion it would likely be another case of finding God guilty by association.”
— Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, Cornell University Press, 1997 p156-157
“...In the second half of the twentieth century a moral sensibility has arisen which judges various aspects of traditional theistic religions to be morally unacceptable or repugnant. We include in this category a feminist consciousness which condemns as immoral the way in which women have been neglected or subjugated within traditional religious behavior and theologies. And we include as well a universalist thinking which finds particularistic moral codes or teachings, allegedly displayed by some traditional religions, to be morally reprehensible.
“But even were we to embrace these moral assessments, we would have no reason whatever to conclude that God did not exist. The most that could be argued would be that if God is really wholly good then the offensive scriptural passages, religious doctrines, attitudes, and practices could not have really come from God. It would not follow in the least that God did not exist. If one did draw such a conclusion it would likely be another case of finding God guilty by association.”
— Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, Cornell University Press, 1997 p156-157
7. Rebuttal:
Theism can distort moral priorities.
Theism can distort moral priorities.
Summary:
Some forms of theism direct energies away from community efforts to genuinely help those in need, towards useless or even unethical behaviors. Faith itself is problematic as a value.
C.S. Lewis, British writer and lay-theologian, 1898-1963
“...Roughly speaking, the word Faith seems to be used by Christians in two senses or on two levels, and I will take them in turn. In the first sense it means simply Belief – accepting or regarding as true the doctrines of Christianity. That is fairly simple. But what does puzzle people – at least it used to puzzle me – is the fact that Christians regard faith in this sense as a virtue. I used to ask how on earth it can be a virtue – what is there moral or immoral about believing or not believing a set of statements? Obviously, I used to say, a sane man accepts or rejects any statement, not because he wants to or does not want to, but because the evidence seems to him good or bad. If he were mistaken about the goodness or badness of the evidence that would not mean he was a bad man, but only that he was not very clever. And if he thought the evidence bad but tried to force himself to believe in spite of it, that would be merely stupid...
“...I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it...
“Now Faith, in the sense in which I am here using the word, is the art of holding on to things your reason has once accepted, in spite of your changing moods. For moods will change, whatever view your reason takes. I know that by experience. Now that I am a Christian I do have moods in which the whole thing looks very improbable: but when I was an atheist I had moods in which Christianity looked terribly probable. This rebellion of your moods against your real self is going to come anyway. That is why Faith is such a necessary virtue: unless you teach your moods ‘where they get off,’ you can never be either a sound Christian or even a sound atheist, but just a creature dithering to and fro, with its beliefs really dependent on the weather and the state of its digestion. Consequently one must train the habit of Fatih.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p115-117
“...Roughly speaking, the word Faith seems to be used by Christians in two senses or on two levels, and I will take them in turn. In the first sense it means simply Belief – accepting or regarding as true the doctrines of Christianity. That is fairly simple. But what does puzzle people – at least it used to puzzle me – is the fact that Christians regard faith in this sense as a virtue. I used to ask how on earth it can be a virtue – what is there moral or immoral about believing or not believing a set of statements? Obviously, I used to say, a sane man accepts or rejects any statement, not because he wants to or does not want to, but because the evidence seems to him good or bad. If he were mistaken about the goodness or badness of the evidence that would not mean he was a bad man, but only that he was not very clever. And if he thought the evidence bad but tried to force himself to believe in spite of it, that would be merely stupid...
“...I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it...
“Now Faith, in the sense in which I am here using the word, is the art of holding on to things your reason has once accepted, in spite of your changing moods. For moods will change, whatever view your reason takes. I know that by experience. Now that I am a Christian I do have moods in which the whole thing looks very improbable: but when I was an atheist I had moods in which Christianity looked terribly probable. This rebellion of your moods against your real self is going to come anyway. That is why Faith is such a necessary virtue: unless you teach your moods ‘where they get off,’ you can never be either a sound Christian or even a sound atheist, but just a creature dithering to and fro, with its beliefs really dependent on the weather and the state of its digestion. Consequently one must train the habit of Fatih.”
— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952), The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperOne, 2017 p115-117
Elmer Leon Towns, American professor of theology & pastor, 1932-
“...A study of civilization shows that no culture has ever risen above its religion, and no religion is greater than its view of God. Therefore, those who have the greatest view of God obviously will have the greatest civilization.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p95
“...The wrong view of God will always cause a multitude of problems in the daily life of a Christian. In contrast, the proper knowledge of God will give wholeness to our beliefs and ultimately to our lives. For if we properly understand God, the other doctrines concerning sin, salvation, angels, the church, and the last things will properly fall together. But when we misunderstand God, we automatically drift in our theology. And those who drift in their theology ultimately suffer in their practical life, because proper belief is the foundation for proper action. Therefore, the only way to regain lost ground is to go back to the core of our beliefs – return to God Himself...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p95
“...A study of civilization shows that no culture has ever risen above its religion, and no religion is greater than its view of God. Therefore, those who have the greatest view of God obviously will have the greatest civilization.”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p95
“...The wrong view of God will always cause a multitude of problems in the daily life of a Christian. In contrast, the proper knowledge of God will give wholeness to our beliefs and ultimately to our lives. For if we properly understand God, the other doctrines concerning sin, salvation, angels, the church, and the last things will properly fall together. But when we misunderstand God, we automatically drift in our theology. And those who drift in their theology ultimately suffer in their practical life, because proper belief is the foundation for proper action. Therefore, the only way to regain lost ground is to go back to the core of our beliefs – return to God Himself...”
— Elmer L. Towns, Theology for Today, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002 p95
8. Rebuttal:
Ascribing spiritual judgements & threats to an intangible God is immoral
Ascribing spiritual judgements & threats to an intangible God is immoral
Summary:
Spiritual threats can modify human behavior, but these are problematic in and of themselves.
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“[quoting Bertrand Russell]‘There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that he believed in hell...’
“This objection seems partly due to misunderstanding Christ’s admonition. People have believed too much and too little. If we say that He believed in everlasting punishment, we are exaggerating His teaching if we mean by that endless, purposeless torture. On the other hand, the idea is minimized if we say that Christ believed in hell, as if a possibility existed that He might not have believed in it. Christ knew of hell as a dreadful reality, and in offering men the gift of eternal life He was also, at immeasurable cost to Himself, able and willing to deliver them from sin and all its consequences. If the thought of hell is horrible to us, we must believe that it was infinitely more abhorrent to Christ.
“Are men to be accused of inhumanity because they believe in the possibility of disaster? We ourselves believe in manifold possibilities of calamity by flood, earthquake and fire: does that show that we are not humane? Moreover, some disasters are preventable, and hell is in this class. Would we think it a moral defect in one who tried to stop an express train moving at speed towards a broken bridge? In the case of those good souls who give up their time to visiting prisons and places of detention, is it inhumane if they warn prisoners of the consequences of persistence in crime? Surely we all know the very opposite to be the truth...
“The difficulties we have in this subject seem to lie partly in certain unfortunate mistranslations, partly in the natural limitations of language to describe eternal realities, and partly in our unhappy tendency to attribute all calamity to God. Let us take a simple example. It may surprise many people to learn that the phrase ‘everlasting punishment’ occurs only once in the Bible (St. Matthew 25:46). The word here translated ‘punishment’ has the force of pruning, restraint or correction (Gk. kolasis). Men prune trees that they may bear fruit. We have surely at least a hint, supported by other evidence, that hell is not purposeless. It is certain that God’s love is all-pervasive and that He will never rest in this world or the next in wrestling for the love and allegiance of men. We cannot fully understand this...
“We must next ask about the meaning of the word ‘everlasting.’ It is easily seen that there is mystery about time. We have already noticed that we cannot imagine a time when time began, or a time when it will end. Similar difficulties arise about space and matter occupying it. When at death we shake off the ‘mortal coil,’ our personality will survive in an environment unlimited by space-time as we know it. ‘Everlasting’ is meaningless applied to life after death: a better translation is ‘eternal’ (Gk. aiōnios). Whereas ‘everlasting’ conveys endlessness in our space-time, ‘eternal’ refers more nearly to the opposite concept of timelessness, or of being outside the kind of time within our experience. ‘Eternal’ is a quality of the life of God, the real changeless life, and yet somehow present in all changes. The phrase ‘everlasting punishment’ is better rendered ‘eternal correction,’ and we find it easier to perceive how purpose need not be excluded from the scheme.
“...When He spoke of hell ‘where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,’ His words were evidently symbolical, since worms are not fireproof! What do they mean? The nearest we can get to an answer to this question may be by thinking of it as a state of feeling frustrated, stifled and yet empty, for man was made for God. The destiny of the man who deliberately and constantly hardens his heart against all the entreaty of God’s love must be a condition of being shut out, as he chose to live, from God’s presence... We ought to be very grateful to Christ for warning us of the inevitable consequence of the completely self-centered life, and for dying to save us from it.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p52-54
“[quoting Bertrand Russell]‘There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that he believed in hell...’
“This objection seems partly due to misunderstanding Christ’s admonition. People have believed too much and too little. If we say that He believed in everlasting punishment, we are exaggerating His teaching if we mean by that endless, purposeless torture. On the other hand, the idea is minimized if we say that Christ believed in hell, as if a possibility existed that He might not have believed in it. Christ knew of hell as a dreadful reality, and in offering men the gift of eternal life He was also, at immeasurable cost to Himself, able and willing to deliver them from sin and all its consequences. If the thought of hell is horrible to us, we must believe that it was infinitely more abhorrent to Christ.
“Are men to be accused of inhumanity because they believe in the possibility of disaster? We ourselves believe in manifold possibilities of calamity by flood, earthquake and fire: does that show that we are not humane? Moreover, some disasters are preventable, and hell is in this class. Would we think it a moral defect in one who tried to stop an express train moving at speed towards a broken bridge? In the case of those good souls who give up their time to visiting prisons and places of detention, is it inhumane if they warn prisoners of the consequences of persistence in crime? Surely we all know the very opposite to be the truth...
“The difficulties we have in this subject seem to lie partly in certain unfortunate mistranslations, partly in the natural limitations of language to describe eternal realities, and partly in our unhappy tendency to attribute all calamity to God. Let us take a simple example. It may surprise many people to learn that the phrase ‘everlasting punishment’ occurs only once in the Bible (St. Matthew 25:46). The word here translated ‘punishment’ has the force of pruning, restraint or correction (Gk. kolasis). Men prune trees that they may bear fruit. We have surely at least a hint, supported by other evidence, that hell is not purposeless. It is certain that God’s love is all-pervasive and that He will never rest in this world or the next in wrestling for the love and allegiance of men. We cannot fully understand this...
“We must next ask about the meaning of the word ‘everlasting.’ It is easily seen that there is mystery about time. We have already noticed that we cannot imagine a time when time began, or a time when it will end. Similar difficulties arise about space and matter occupying it. When at death we shake off the ‘mortal coil,’ our personality will survive in an environment unlimited by space-time as we know it. ‘Everlasting’ is meaningless applied to life after death: a better translation is ‘eternal’ (Gk. aiōnios). Whereas ‘everlasting’ conveys endlessness in our space-time, ‘eternal’ refers more nearly to the opposite concept of timelessness, or of being outside the kind of time within our experience. ‘Eternal’ is a quality of the life of God, the real changeless life, and yet somehow present in all changes. The phrase ‘everlasting punishment’ is better rendered ‘eternal correction,’ and we find it easier to perceive how purpose need not be excluded from the scheme.
“...When He spoke of hell ‘where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,’ His words were evidently symbolical, since worms are not fireproof! What do they mean? The nearest we can get to an answer to this question may be by thinking of it as a state of feeling frustrated, stifled and yet empty, for man was made for God. The destiny of the man who deliberately and constantly hardens his heart against all the entreaty of God’s love must be a condition of being shut out, as he chose to live, from God’s presence... We ought to be very grateful to Christ for warning us of the inevitable consequence of the completely self-centered life, and for dying to save us from it.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p52-54
9. Rebuttal:
Argument from Humanism
Argument from Humanism
Summary:
People don’t need an authoritarian god to act morally. All people are inherently of worth, and a moral system can be built around the concept of avoiding harm and reducing suffering. It is a higher virtue to act ethically for its own sake, not out of fear or hope for reward.
J.P. Moreland, American philosopher & theologian, 1948-
“A typical atheist response to all of this is to say there are no irreducible moral truths in the world or irreducible moral properties. What one must do is to ‘create’ values or decide to adopt the moral point of view. But it doesn’t seem to me that the choice between Mother Teresa and Hitler can be likened, say, to the choice as to whether I am going to be a baseball player or a tuba player. Such a choice is not a rational one, and according to this response to the theistic argument, neither is the choice of adopting a moral point of view.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p36
“According to [the view of optimistic humanism], there are no moral facts. There are no truths to be discovered in an old-fashioned correspondent sense of the word ‘truth.’ And we can’t ground morality in any kind of sense of pure reason or rational deliberation without sentiment and without what he calls ’wide reflective equilibrium.’ And remember, wide reflective equilibrium, just as John Rawls uses it, is not just a theory of epistemic justification; in other words, it’s not just a theory of how we justify our beliefs. It is an ontological theory about what truth is. It is a coherence theory, not of justification only, but of truth. Reflective equilibrium creates our moral views; it does not merely justify them.
“Now one problem with a coherence theory of truth is this: You can have two coherent webs of beliefs that are both internally consistent. One of these systems of beliefs can say that p is legitimate and the other one can entail that not-p is legitimate. And according to a coherency theory of truth, both p and not-p would be correct. The standard objection against coherent theories of truth is that it removes the connection between propositions and a full blown, realist, mind- or theory- or language-independent world. You can have more than one system that’s internally consistent; one can imply p and the other not-p. And according to that view, we would be in the position of saying both were true.
“I might add as well that it seems to me that optimistic humanism tends toward formal autonomy-based ethics. Stanley Hauerwas at Duke has argued against such an autonomy-based ethic, because it reduces to a minimalist ethic wherein the good is ultimately what I competently and autonomously choose for myself, provided, of course, that I do not harm or offend others. This may be a necessary condition for an act of mine to be moral, but it is not sufficient; that the good is what I choose for myself is too empty. It is too formal to get us very far, and what we really need is a substantive theory of the good life. We require a substantive vision of the moral life to give content to formal principles of morality. And in my opinion, this substantive vision of the moral life is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth. Christianity does not leave morality at the abstract level of principles. Moral virtue and vision is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth and others in the Scriptures. According to a Christian view of the world, virtue properties exist and can be instanced in persons, and virtues and vices can be epistemologically distinguished.“But the optimistic humanist view will have none of that. There are no irreducibly non-natural properties, and we have to engage in a coherence reflective equilibrium where we create values by coherence. We don’t discover them.
“Second, why is it that someone should choose the moral point of view? As Nielsen had said elsewhere, choosing to embrace the moral point of view, visà-vis some form of private personal egoism, is arbitrary and subjective. It is not a rational decision. One simply has to choose what kind of life he wants to live and make his choice.
“...When [Nielsen] talked earlier [in the debate], he said, ’We have to choose our vision of life, and we can have plenty of things that we find worthwhile even if God does not exist.’ Of course, the kinds of things he mentioned were the kinds of things that most people already know within theism are reasonable, like friendship, pursuing love, and so on.
“The radical nature of this thesis, however, is that if there is no moral truth to be discovered and if I have to simply choose the moral point of view because that type of life is what I find worthwhile for myself, then the decision is arbitrary, rationally speaking. And the difference between, say, Mother Teresa and Hitler is roughly the same as the difference between whether I want to be a trumpet player or a baseball player. There is no rational factor or truth of the matter at stake. There are no moral truths that can be discovered to adjudicate between the two choices. I have to just decide my form of life.
“This type of thing has surfaced recently in a book by James Rachels called The End of Life. Rachels says that we don’t need purpose in the sense of an over-arching objective purpose to life, but we can have purpose in life, as Nielsen says. And he means by that ‘subjective satisfaction,’ things that we find worthwhile to us. Now if this is true, what’s the difference, let’s say, between becoming a doctor and feeding the poor, and sitting around pinching the heads off rats or being a Sisyphus and pushing a rock up and down a hill, or giving your time to flipping tiddlywinks? There is no difference since each of these options could be satisfying and worthwhile to someone.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p116-117
“[Kai] Nielsen has said time and time again, and he’s right, that atheists can in fact do good moral things. But what I’m arguing is, What would be the point? Why should I do these things if they are not satisfying to me or if they are not in my interests?
“This is a serious problem. It does not occur within theism, but it does occur within the optimistic humanist version of atheism. If there is no human nature which has intrinsic moral value as Nielsen says elsewhere, the question can arise: ‘Here I am with my money. Why should I give it to help the poor instead of keeping it and having a little better life for myself?’ Well, a response might be that doing morally virtuous acts is what it means to take the moral point of view. This means that you universalize your judgments, you treat others as ends in themselves and yourself as an end in itself, you seek to promote the good, and so on.
“But the problem is, Why should I take the moral point of view? ‘Well, what if you were in his shoes?’ the answer could come back. But you see, I’m not in his shoes. ‘Well, if you were in his shoes, you would want him to do the same to you.’ Yes, but the difficulty is, you’re already operating from within the moral point of view, and my question is, Why should I adopt the moral point of view as a part of my rational life plan? That’s the very thing at issue.’”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p118
“Well, one way to go at this is just to say it’s egoistically better to adopt the moral point of view. After all, it’s better to live in community with other people rather than live a nasty, brutish, short life, and so I give up some of my rights because it is in my self-interest to do so. I will be egoistically altruistic. I will do things for you out of an egoistic motivation and because of an egoistic justification.
“Now, apart from the fact that this appears to be a contradiction to me–ethical egoism appears to contradict the moral point of view–this type of recommendation suffers from the very same objection that [Kai] Nielsen himself has raised against the Christian notion of hell. He said if a person merely embraces God out of a desire to cover his cosmic rear end and to avoid getting flames on it, then he is guilty of egoism.
“The very same thing seems to me to be true of someone who is saying, ‘Now I think I’ll consider the moral point of view. Why should I adopt it? Well because it’s in my best interest to do so. And in fact I will adopt the moral point of view except in those cases when it’s not in my best interest to do so.’ It doesn’t seem to me that optimistic humanism can offer a good reason why one ought not to do that, rationally speaking. The point is that on the optimistic humanist view, we now substitute subjective satisfaction for objective value and meaning.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p118-119
“A typical atheist response to all of this is to say there are no irreducible moral truths in the world or irreducible moral properties. What one must do is to ‘create’ values or decide to adopt the moral point of view. But it doesn’t seem to me that the choice between Mother Teresa and Hitler can be likened, say, to the choice as to whether I am going to be a baseball player or a tuba player. Such a choice is not a rational one, and according to this response to the theistic argument, neither is the choice of adopting a moral point of view.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p36
“According to [the view of optimistic humanism], there are no moral facts. There are no truths to be discovered in an old-fashioned correspondent sense of the word ‘truth.’ And we can’t ground morality in any kind of sense of pure reason or rational deliberation without sentiment and without what he calls ’wide reflective equilibrium.’ And remember, wide reflective equilibrium, just as John Rawls uses it, is not just a theory of epistemic justification; in other words, it’s not just a theory of how we justify our beliefs. It is an ontological theory about what truth is. It is a coherence theory, not of justification only, but of truth. Reflective equilibrium creates our moral views; it does not merely justify them.
“Now one problem with a coherence theory of truth is this: You can have two coherent webs of beliefs that are both internally consistent. One of these systems of beliefs can say that p is legitimate and the other one can entail that not-p is legitimate. And according to a coherency theory of truth, both p and not-p would be correct. The standard objection against coherent theories of truth is that it removes the connection between propositions and a full blown, realist, mind- or theory- or language-independent world. You can have more than one system that’s internally consistent; one can imply p and the other not-p. And according to that view, we would be in the position of saying both were true.
“I might add as well that it seems to me that optimistic humanism tends toward formal autonomy-based ethics. Stanley Hauerwas at Duke has argued against such an autonomy-based ethic, because it reduces to a minimalist ethic wherein the good is ultimately what I competently and autonomously choose for myself, provided, of course, that I do not harm or offend others. This may be a necessary condition for an act of mine to be moral, but it is not sufficient; that the good is what I choose for myself is too empty. It is too formal to get us very far, and what we really need is a substantive theory of the good life. We require a substantive vision of the moral life to give content to formal principles of morality. And in my opinion, this substantive vision of the moral life is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth. Christianity does not leave morality at the abstract level of principles. Moral virtue and vision is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth and others in the Scriptures. According to a Christian view of the world, virtue properties exist and can be instanced in persons, and virtues and vices can be epistemologically distinguished.“But the optimistic humanist view will have none of that. There are no irreducibly non-natural properties, and we have to engage in a coherence reflective equilibrium where we create values by coherence. We don’t discover them.
“Second, why is it that someone should choose the moral point of view? As Nielsen had said elsewhere, choosing to embrace the moral point of view, visà-vis some form of private personal egoism, is arbitrary and subjective. It is not a rational decision. One simply has to choose what kind of life he wants to live and make his choice.
“...When [Nielsen] talked earlier [in the debate], he said, ’We have to choose our vision of life, and we can have plenty of things that we find worthwhile even if God does not exist.’ Of course, the kinds of things he mentioned were the kinds of things that most people already know within theism are reasonable, like friendship, pursuing love, and so on.
“The radical nature of this thesis, however, is that if there is no moral truth to be discovered and if I have to simply choose the moral point of view because that type of life is what I find worthwhile for myself, then the decision is arbitrary, rationally speaking. And the difference between, say, Mother Teresa and Hitler is roughly the same as the difference between whether I want to be a trumpet player or a baseball player. There is no rational factor or truth of the matter at stake. There are no moral truths that can be discovered to adjudicate between the two choices. I have to just decide my form of life.
“This type of thing has surfaced recently in a book by James Rachels called The End of Life. Rachels says that we don’t need purpose in the sense of an over-arching objective purpose to life, but we can have purpose in life, as Nielsen says. And he means by that ‘subjective satisfaction,’ things that we find worthwhile to us. Now if this is true, what’s the difference, let’s say, between becoming a doctor and feeding the poor, and sitting around pinching the heads off rats or being a Sisyphus and pushing a rock up and down a hill, or giving your time to flipping tiddlywinks? There is no difference since each of these options could be satisfying and worthwhile to someone.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p116-117
“[Kai] Nielsen has said time and time again, and he’s right, that atheists can in fact do good moral things. But what I’m arguing is, What would be the point? Why should I do these things if they are not satisfying to me or if they are not in my interests?
“This is a serious problem. It does not occur within theism, but it does occur within the optimistic humanist version of atheism. If there is no human nature which has intrinsic moral value as Nielsen says elsewhere, the question can arise: ‘Here I am with my money. Why should I give it to help the poor instead of keeping it and having a little better life for myself?’ Well, a response might be that doing morally virtuous acts is what it means to take the moral point of view. This means that you universalize your judgments, you treat others as ends in themselves and yourself as an end in itself, you seek to promote the good, and so on.
“But the problem is, Why should I take the moral point of view? ‘Well, what if you were in his shoes?’ the answer could come back. But you see, I’m not in his shoes. ‘Well, if you were in his shoes, you would want him to do the same to you.’ Yes, but the difficulty is, you’re already operating from within the moral point of view, and my question is, Why should I adopt the moral point of view as a part of my rational life plan? That’s the very thing at issue.’”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p118
“Well, one way to go at this is just to say it’s egoistically better to adopt the moral point of view. After all, it’s better to live in community with other people rather than live a nasty, brutish, short life, and so I give up some of my rights because it is in my self-interest to do so. I will be egoistically altruistic. I will do things for you out of an egoistic motivation and because of an egoistic justification.
“Now, apart from the fact that this appears to be a contradiction to me–ethical egoism appears to contradict the moral point of view–this type of recommendation suffers from the very same objection that [Kai] Nielsen himself has raised against the Christian notion of hell. He said if a person merely embraces God out of a desire to cover his cosmic rear end and to avoid getting flames on it, then he is guilty of egoism.
“The very same thing seems to me to be true of someone who is saying, ‘Now I think I’ll consider the moral point of view. Why should I adopt it? Well because it’s in my best interest to do so. And in fact I will adopt the moral point of view except in those cases when it’s not in my best interest to do so.’ It doesn’t seem to me that optimistic humanism can offer a good reason why one ought not to do that, rationally speaking. The point is that on the optimistic humanist view, we now substitute subjective satisfaction for objective value and meaning.”
— J.P. Moreland, Does God Exist?, Prometheus Books, 1988 p118-119
C.H. Douglas Clark, British inorganic & structural chemistry professor, 1890-19??
“It seems that humanism cannot help us until our desires are changed by dedication to the kind of message Christ gave to the world. Intelligence without the fire of spiritual purpose may be a positive menace. Man is in a precarious position in which he might be destroyed unless he listens to spiritual admonitions and the teaching of Christ. The divine spark in him seems all too easily extinguished. Voltaire called atheism the vice of a few intelligent men. Only when intelligence is enlightened by belief in God can it be directed effectively to the solution of our human problems.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p76
“It seems that humanism cannot help us until our desires are changed by dedication to the kind of message Christ gave to the world. Intelligence without the fire of spiritual purpose may be a positive menace. Man is in a precarious position in which he might be destroyed unless he listens to spiritual admonitions and the teaching of Christ. The divine spark in him seems all too easily extinguished. Voltaire called atheism the vice of a few intelligent men. Only when intelligence is enlightened by belief in God can it be directed effectively to the solution of our human problems.”
— C.H. Douglas Clark, Christianity and Bertrand Russell: A Critique of the Essay: ‘Why I Am Not a Christian,’ Lutterworth Press, 1958 p76